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				<bibl><publisher>TRP document creator: chris.burns@uvm.edu</publisher></bibl>
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			<p>
				<lg>
					<l>FROM: National Broadcasting Company.</l>
					<l>Trans Lux Building, Washington, D. C.</l>
					<l>October 16, 1939.</l>
					<l>FOR RELEASE AFTER 10:30 P.M., EST, OCTOBER 16th.</l>
					<l>Address of Honorable Warren R. Austin, United States Senator from Vermont,</l>
					<l>broadcast over a National Broadcasting Company network, made during the National</l>
					<l>Radio Forum, arranged by the Washington Star, Monday night, October 16th. 1939.</l>
					<l>CHANGING EMBARGOES FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE</l>
					<l>THE UNITED STATES INTENDS NOT TO GO TO WAR, NOT TO INTERVENE,</l>
					<l>AND NOT TO BECOME A BELLIGERENT.</l>
					<l>In the pending war, the nationals of the United States will be nindered and</l>
					<l>impeded by their Government in their commerce on the seas with belligerents. They</l>
					<l>will not have the aid of their Government in that commerce. They will not have even</l>
					<l>the immunity from interference by their Government which has been the common right</l>
					<l>of the nationals of all neutrals during all times.</l>
					<l>It is absurd to say that the United States intervenes when, by statute, it</l>
					<l>embargoes its nationals, its vessels on the high seas, and everything it produces.</l>
					<l>The scare talk that lifting the embargo means war beclouds rational con-</l>
					<l>sideration of the facts and policy. It should be given little weight. It seems to</l>
					<l>me to be illogical. We cannot become a belligerent and go to war unless some foreign</l>
					<l>State attacks us, or unless we attack some other State.</l>
					<l>On the first alternative, I point to the fact that the Congress is in</l>
					<l>Extraordinary Session for the express purpose of enacting additional defense legis-</l>
					<l>lation calculated to build up our strength so that no foreign State will choose to</l>
					<l>attack us.</l>
					<l>On the second alternative, you are conscious that the determination of the</l>
					<l>people of this Country to remain at peace is such that we will not become an aggressor</l>
					<l>and declare war on any State, save as a last defense of our security and the princi-</l>
					<l>ples which constitute the life of the Republic.</l>
					<l>During the course of my discussion, I hope to make clear that the legisla¬</l>
					<l>tion which Congress now debates is designed to avoid causes for war, and to remove,</l>
					<l>as far as possible, from the United States even the chance events which might irri-</l>
					<l>tate our own people into warlike fervor. Without an act of Congress, we cannot be-</l>
					<l>come a belligerent, we cannot intervene in a military way, we cannot go to war.</l>
					<l>We consider the pending question in the light of the settled purpose of</l>
					<l>Congress to not send our sons and daughters over-seas to engage in foreign wars.</l>
					<l>The last act, even of national defense, is the mobilizing of the youth of America</l>
					<l>to engage in mortal combat. So let us settle back and calmly consider the choice</l>
					<l>that we have to make between Embargoes.</l>
					<l>We start with a true premise, namely: the pending legislation constitutes</l>
					<l>a substitution of a broad Embargo for the narrow Embargo which now exists.</l>
					<l>The erroneous impression, implicit in the popular slogan &quot;Lift the Embargo,</l>
					<l>and Substitute Cash and Carry&quot;, is corrected through the debate which is proceeding</l>
					<l>in the Senate.</l>
					<l>Now that a state of war has been proclaimed, we are not to choose between</l>
					<l>Embargo and No Embargo. We are to choose between two Embargoes. The present one</l>
					<l>prohibits export of &quot;arms, ammunition, or implements of war&quot;. The contemplated sub-</l>
					<l>stitute Embargo would bar from the seas American vessels, American men, and American</l>
					<l>articles and materials. If it should become law, nothing American whatever could be</l>
					<l>in commerce on the high seas between the United States and a belligerent port, be-</l>
					<l>tween the United States and a neutral port, where the commerce enters or passes</l>
					<l>through combat areas to be prescribed by the President, because title must change</l>
					<l>to the purchaser before it leaves the United States. This would avoid the hazard of</l>
					<l>inflammatory reaction on us from sinking of property.</l>
				</lg>
			</p>
			<pb n='2'/>
			<p>
				<lg>
					<l>- 2 -</l>
					<l>The deprivation of freedom of our citizens to travel would be extensive,</l>
					<l>for it would be unlawful, except under rules prescribed by the President, for any</l>
					<l>citizen of the United States to proceed into or through combat areas, or to travel</l>
					<l>on any vessel of such belligerents. This would render remote the provocation from</l>
					<l>loss of life exception is created favoring Canada. Passengers and articles or ma-</l>
					<l>terials could be lawfully carried by American vessels on lakes, rivers, and inland</l>
					<l>waters as well as by aircraft over lands, bordering the United States, though such</l>
					<l>transportation would be subject to such restrictions, rules, and regulations as the</l>
					<l>President shall prescribe.</l>
					<l>The unfortified line, three thousand miles long, between Canada and the</l>
					<l>United States, mores us to favor the cause of Canada as a protection of our tran-</l>
					<l>quility.</l>
					<l>Moreover, this accords with our ancient friendship, and the homogenity</l>
					<l>of principles and ideals of our two countries.</l>
					<l>The harsh restrictions on vessels include loss of established transporta-</l>
					<l>tion routes and connections gained in a competitive battle at great cost to our</l>
					<l>Government and its citizens through twenty years of struggle. In parlance of the</l>
					<l>sea &quot;we would not keep the berth warm&quot;.</l>
					<l>Also included would be the loss to our producers of fruit, cotton, wheat,</l>
					<l>and other agricultural products, of a delicately balanced refrigerating, storage,</l>
					<l>transportation and marketing organism, the repercussions of which must be cushioned</l>
					<l>with taxpayers&apos; money; the deprivation of neutrals and belligerents, who are de-</l>
					<l>pendent upon our natural resources brought to them through American commerce, of</l>
					<l>diet, clothing and other necessities of life; the making difficult of procurement</l>
					<l>for America of strategic and essential materials because our ships could not afford</l>
					<l>to go out empty of cargo for the sole purpose of bringing back these materials.</l>
					<l>These materials are essential to our national defense. They include manganese,</l>
					<l>aluminum, antimony seed, chromium, cocoanut shell char, manila fibre, mica, nickel,</l>
					<l>wool, optical glass, quartz crystal, quick-silver, quinine, rubber, silk, tin, and</l>
					<l>tungsten. In addition to these, we must lose freedom of access to twenty-two</l>
					<l>critical commodities such as coffee, cadmium, cork, cryolite, graphite, opium, etc.</l>
					<l>Most serious of all the injuries suffered through the severity of the</l>
					<l>restrictions upon American vessels is the injury to our national defense.</l>
					<l>Mercantile Marine Act of 1936, under which we are building up our merchant fleet,</l>
					<l>was based on its auxiliary service to the United States Navy. A fleet must have</l>
					<l>fuel: it must, therefore, have tankers, with competent speed. A fleet must have</l>
					<l>feeding, and housing also. It must have vessels for hospitalization, for shelter</l>
					<l>of personnel of small vessels, such as submarine, aircraft, and destroyers. It</l>
					<l>must have access to basic materials and to supplies. Without a merchant marine, a</l>
					<l>navy could not serve.</l>
					<l>Therefore, it is to be hoped that the restrictive Embargoes on American</l>
					<l>shipping may be reasonably relaxed by amendment of the pending bill.</l>
					<l>But dealing with the proposed legislation as it stands tonight, I favor</l>
					<l>its adoption for the following reasons:</l>
					<l>It would promote our national defense;</l>
					<l>It would make more remote our getting into war;</l>
					<l>It would increase the probability of victory of the Allies:</l>
					<l>It would tend to shorten the war;</l>
					<l>It would keep the battle front far away from America;</l>
					<l>It would help to keep the ocean the protection for us that it</l>
					<l>has been while our vis-a-vis navy was under the British flag.</l>
					<l>The United States has been on the defensive throughout the Seventy-sixth</l>
					<l>Congress. While the Military Affairs Committees of the House and Senate developed</l>
					<l>a military, naval, and aerial plan for national defense; the Committees of both</l>
					<l>houses having jurisdiction of our foreign relations were at work, trying to promote</l>
					<l>such governmental action as would keep us at peace, and at the same time protect</l>
					<l>including this special session</l>
				</lg>
			</p>
			<pb n='3'/>
			<p>
				<lg>
					<l>- 3.</l>
					<l>our free institutions and our territory from aggression. The evidence showed, at</l>
					<l>the beginning of the Session, an environment of danger; wars proceeding, all the</l>
					<l>great treaty powers of the world armed and getting ready for mobilization, even the</l>
					<l>Western hamisphere penetrated covertly, and in peaceful disguise, by the dynamic</l>
					<l>foreign policy of National Socialism, having the implications of an effort to set</l>
					<l>up a world empire. Within striking distance of the Panama Canal, namely, in</l>
					<l>Colombia, an airways system, of which the crews were at least 95% German; a system of</l>
					<l>of airlines being established around Latin America with adequate bases and stations</l>
					<l><hi rend='strikethrough:true;'>with</hi></l>
					<l>and</l>
					<l>stocks of convertible parts adaptable to military planes as well as commercial</l>
					<l>planes, so that if Germany wanted to fly military versions of the Folke-Wulf planes</l>
					<l>to Latin America, they would there have <hi rend='strikethrough:true;'>all</hi> ready adequate supplies for military</l>
					<l>use. The parts of the commercial ships <hi rend='strikethrough:true;'>all</hi> ready in Latin America are interchange-</l>
					<l>able with parts for bombers and for other military planes. If Germany should wish</l>
					<l>to send a large number of bombing planes through Latin America to our Southern</l>
					<l>boundaries she would have the facilities to do so, she would have the fuel supplies</l>
					<l>in large reserves, she would have the parts, she would have the replacements, and</l>
					<l>the personnel, if they were needed.</l>
					<l>Such a picture clearly given to the Committee on Military Affairs could</l>
					<l>not be ignored with prudence. It appeared from the evidence that Germany was send-</l>
					<l>ing able technicians to Latin America who had recently been trained in special</l>
					<l>courses in the economic theories, and the political philosophies of their own</l>
					<l>country, in technique, in diplomacy, and in the language of the country where they</l>
					<l>were going.</l>
					<l>Moreover, the trend of exportation of aircraft was significant. Whereas</l>
					<l>our Latin American exports of aeronautical products in 1938 increased 19.7 percent</l>
					<l>over 1937, Latin American sales of totalitarian aircraft gained about 300% in those</l>
					<l>two years. This tremendous gain in totalitarian exports of aeronautical products</l>
					<l>in Latin America was consistent with the foreign policy of Germany recently asso-</l>
					<l>ciated with claims of pressure of population, the so-called natural right to room</l>
					<l>to live&quot;, the search for raw materials, and, with geographic and political ambitions</l>
					<l>of world extent. New world contours had already been etched on the globe by the</l>
					<l>bayonet of totalitarian powers.</l>
					<l>The present war had not yet begun. It was anticipated by some. Never-</l>
					<l>theless, the Military Affairs Committee of the Senate was informed that if Germany</l>
					<l>should get control of Spain and Portugal, established bases in the Azores, in the</l>
					<l>Cape Verde Islands, and in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in West Africa, she</l>
					<l>would have complete control, so far as the air is concerned, of the Eastern half of</l>
					<l>the Atlantic Ocean. Seventeen hundred of the aeroplanes that Germany then had were</l>
					<l>capable of flying from the West Coast of Africa to the East Coast of South America.</l>
					<l>Prudence dictated that Congress contemplate the possibility of such progress that</l>
					<l>she would be able to fly in the near future from the Cape Verde Islands to the</l>
					<l>United States.</l>
					<l>The possibility, even though remote, of Germany conquering England and</l>
					<l>France, obtaining control of their navies and investing Canada and nearby islands,</l>
					<l>made national defense a paramount concern of this Session of Congress.</l>
					<l>The cold facts which confronted us demanded prompt measures to strengthen</l>
					<l>our military establishment. With relatively little debate Congress appropriated</l>
					<l>approximately two billions of dollars to effectuate the President&apos;s plan for this</l>
					<l>purpose.</l>
					<l>Indirectly involved in this study was our</l>
					<l>National</l>
					<l>attitude toward the possible</l>
					<l>belligerents in the anticipated war. This attitude also primarily concerned our</l>
					<l>national defense. The crash of a bomber being tested on our west coast, in which</l>
					<l>a French officer perished, precipitated the foreign policy issue. The identical</l>
					<l>differences arose over sales of planes to Britain and France already contracted for</l>
					<l>as we are now debating on the so-called Neutrality Act of 1939. It became clear to</l>
					<l>us that the sale and exportation of military planes to Great Britain and France was</l>
					<l>a proper element of our national defense because it stepped up production in this</l>
					<l>country of such defensive weapons, and it did not interfere with procurement, for</l>
					<l>ourselves; it developed the special knowledge and skill of our scientists and work-</l>
					<l>men, so that we could move forward with the progress of those who learn by experience</l>
					<l>in their use of the technical improvements which so soon render obsolete the</l>
					<l>munitions of current days.</l>
					<l>Here let me indicate something which I regard as a natural fallacy. Dis-</l>
					<l>tinguished debaters who oppose the pending resolution argue that we should keep the</l>
					<l>munitions which we manufacture for our own defense, and that we should not ship</l>
				</lg>
			</p>
			<pb n='4'/>
			<p>
				<lg>
					<l>them abroad. The answer is: we do not want these particular munitions. If we</l>
					<l>should ever need munitions we would want the most modern product of the experience</l>
					<l>we are now gaining at the expense of the foreign purchasers. If we should ever</l>
					<l>need munitions we would want the capacity to reproduce and keep the line comi</l>
					<l>We would not want to be dependent on stores of obsolete planes, for example. There¬</l>
					<l>fore, sale to the Allies then and now is an important element of our defensive plan.</l>
					<l>I discuss Neutrality only briefly, because the law of self-defense trans-</l>
					<l>cends other rules of international conduct.</l>
					<l>Montesquieu, speaking to us with venerable accent and profound wisdom,</l>
					<l>says -</l>
					<l>&quot;Reason is the spirit of the law; if</l>
					<l>there be no reason there is no law.</l>
					<l>We are familiar with the rule of self-defense, which extends to whatever</l>
					<l>limit of action may be necessary.</l>
					<l>The reason for this in domestic law is the same for international law,</l>
					<l>namely, imperative necessity.</l>
					<l>If we were neutral the obligations on us as a Government would not re¬</l>
					<l>quire us to do what we propose to do in the way of embargoing the intercourse of</l>
					<l>our nationals with other neutrals and belligerents. Even though international law</l>
					<l>forbids the supplying in any manner, directly or indirectly, by a neutral power to</l>
					<l>a belligerent power, of arms, ammunition and implements of warfare, or of war</l>
					<l>material of any kind whatever, nevertheless, a neutral power is not bound to pre¬</l>
					<l>vent the export or transit, by its nationals, for, the use of either belligerents,</l>
					<l>of arms, ammunition, or in general, of anything which could be of use to an army</l>
					<l>or fleet.</l>
					<l>The rights of a neutral government are thus less than those of its</l>
					<l>nationals.</l>
					<l>In 1935 and 1937, in connection with the Neutrality legislation, and dur-</l>
					<l>ing the campaign of 1938, as well as in this 76th Congress, I have stated my po¬</l>
					<l>sition publicly, that it would have been better for this Government to repeal the</l>
					<l>Embargo Acts and return to international law. The foregoing is the essential part</l>
					<l>thereof affecting the pending issue. The record would have been clearer for</l>
					<l>posterity. The attitude of America would have accorded with her tradition, namely:</l>
					<l>an attitude of independence, though not isolation. She would have been free to</l>
					<l>adapt her action to the changing circumstances. Since it has become apparent that</l>
					<l>this cannot be done, and that the Government, as such, is about to adhere to re¬</l>
					<l>strictive action which it is not bound by international law to take, we are not</l>
					<l>concerned with the neutrality or unneutrality of the Resolution. We are concerned</l>
					<l>only with the fact that it is in our interest as a sovereignty and for the peace</l>
					<l>and security of our nationals, that we adopt it.</l>
					<l>By the Embargo Act of 1937, our attitude, as a Government, has the effect</l>
					<l>of partiality to Germany. It is as offective in interferring with acquisition of</l>
					<l>arms, ammunition, and implements of war by the Allies as a blockade successfully</l>
					<l>maintained by Germany. Pro tanto, it is as effective as a fleet of submarines</l>
					<l>operating against the Allies.</l>
					<l>The folly in the Act of 1937, which caused a few of us to vote against it,</l>
					<l>is now more widely recognized. It undertook to bind the United States in advance</l>
					<l>of the event to a course of action, the need and the consequence of which we could</l>
					<l>not foresee.</l>
					<l>Now, needing the defense value of speedy victory by the Allies, we observe</l>
					<l>our embargo of 1937 operating against the Allies, and in favor of the aggressor.</l>
					<l>We now see that we deprive the Allies of rights belonging to them by virtue</l>
					<l>of their geographical position. As we have pointed out, the exercise of these rights</l>
					<l>by them would tend to protect our institutions and our peace. The early success of</l>
					<l>the Allies is vitally necessary to keep the unplumbed depths of ocean between the</l>
					<l>aggressor and us.</l>
					<l>To the extent that the proposed Resolution binds us to Embargoes in some</l>
					<l>other future war, it is subject to a similar criticism: that we cannot foretell</l>
					<l>what our interest may be or what position we should take.</l>
				</lg>
			</p>
			<pb n='5'/>
			<p>
				<lg>
					<l>5</l>
					<l>It is my opinion that the Resolution ought to be amended to provide for its</l>
					<l>expiration as soon as the state of war has ceased to exist.</l>
					<l>Our present grave concern about the preservation of Republican liberty in</l>
					<l>this Country dictates adherence to the exclusive prerogative of this Government</l>
					<l>to decide as each case arises what character of international conduct this Government</l>
					<l>will adopt.</l>
					<l>Chief Justice Hughes, when Secretary of State, within a few years after</l>
					<l>the World War, characterized this policy in an address to the American Bar Associa-</l>
					<l>tion, thus:</l>
					<l>&quot;Our people are still intent upon abstaining from participation</l>
					<l>in the political strife of Europe. They are not disposed to commit</l>
					<l>this government in advance to the use of its power in unknown con¬</l>
					<l>tingencies, preferring to reserve freedom of action in the confidence</l>
					<l>of our ability and readiness to respond to every future call of duty.</l>
					<l>They have no desire to put their power in pledge, but they do not</l>
					<l>shirk cooperation with other nations whenever there is a sound basis</l>
					<l>for it and a consciousness of community of interest and aim. Coop¬</l>
					<l>eration is not dictatorship and it is not partisanship. On our part</l>
					<l>it must be the cooperation of a free people drawing their strength</l>
					<l>from many racial stocks, and a cooperation that is made possible by</l>
					<l>a preponderant sentiment permitting governmental action under a system</l>
					<l>which denies all exercise, of autocratic power. It will be the coop¬</l>
					<l>eration of a people of liberal ideals, deeply concerned with the</l>
					<l>maintenance of peace and interested in all measures which find sup-</l>
					<l>port in the common sense of the country as being practical and well</l>
					<l>designed to foster common interests.</l>
					<l>As a people, we would like to have our Government on friendly terms with</l>
					<l>all States, totalitarian, as well as democratic. We would not interfere with the</l>
					<l>right of every nation to conform to its own beliefs without trespassing upon us, but</l>
					<l>in both peace and war, this Republic must defend itself against dominance by others,</l>
					<l>and against insidious sapping of the battlements of its freedom.</l>
					<l><hi rend='strikethrough:true;'>Isolation</hi></l>
					<l>I credit the distinguished opponents of the pending Resolution with recog</l>
					<l>nition of the dangers of isolation. I think that it is inaccurate to label them</l>
					<l>&quot;isolationists&quot;. However, there are worthy citizens who have communicated to me the</l>
					<l>belief that we should adopt an attitude of withdrawal commercially to our continental</l>
					<l>area for the duration of the war. I believe that it is the general opinion of all</l>
					<l>Senators now debating the issue that such action would require nationalizing of all</l>
					<l>production and industry, and further centralizing all Government in Washington. We</l>
					<l>are aware of the difficulties of enforcement of that type of Embargo, exemplified,</l>
					<l>as they were, by even bloody resistance during the Jefferson Embargo.</l>
					<l>As the historian, Bancroft, has so well put it:</l>
					<l>&quot;Commerce defies every wind, outrides every</l>
					<l>tempest, invades every zone.</l>
					<l>Moreover, the danger of establishing non-participation in the trade and</l>
					<l>finance of the world is that such action would require a vast financing scheme to</l>
					<l>further organize control of all business and commercial activities, to cushion the</l>
					<l>fall of industfal employment, agricultural marketing, and the lack of necessary</l>
					<l>materials not obtainable here. The dictatorship perfected thereby would insure to</l>
					<l>us and to our posterity a curse of unhappiness.</l>
					<l>Isolation would be almost as dangerous to our institutions as war. By</l>
					<l>either Isolation or War, we would lose much that our forefathers sacrificed to gain</l>
					<l>and to transmit to us.</l>
					<l>To choose the type of Embargo provided for by the pending Resolution, in-</l>
					<l>stead of the existing Embargo, would aid in our national defense, and would tend</l>
					<l>to prevent both Isolation and War.</l>
					<l>It would help this Generation of Americans to discharge their high obli-</l>
					<l>gation to preserve the Republic and to maintain peace.</l>
				</lg>
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